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Abstract
Logit choice dynamics are a family of randomized best response dynamics based on the
logit choice function [29] that is used for modeling players with limited rationality and
knowledge. In this paper we study the all-logit dynamics, where at each time step all
players concurrently update their strategies according to the logit choice function. In the
well studied one-logit dynamics [10] instead at each step only one randomly chosen player
is allowed to update.
We study properties of the all-logit dynamics in the context of local interaction games,
a class of games that has been used to model complex social phenomena [10, 38, 32] and
physical systems [27]. In a local interaction game, players are the vertices of a social graph
whose edges are two-player potential games. Each player picks one strategy to be played for
all the games she is involved in and the payoff of the player is the sum of the payoffs from
each of the games. We prove that local interaction games characterize the class of games
for which the all-logit dynamics is reversible.
We then compare the stationary behavior of one-logit and all-logit dynamics. Specifically,
we look at the expected value of a notable class of observables, that we call decomposable
observables. We prove that the difference between the expected values of the observables at
stationarity for the two dynamics depends only on the rationality level β and on the distance
of the social graph from a bipartite graph. In particular, if the social graph is bipartite then
decomposable observables have the same expected value. Finally, we show that the mixing
time of the all-logit dynamics has the same twofold behavior that has been highlighted in
the case of the one-logit: for some games it exponentially depends on the rationality level
β, whereas for other games it can be upper bounded by a function independent from β.
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1 Introduction
In the last decade, we have observed an increasing interest in understanding phenomena oc-
curring in complex systems consisting of a large number of simple networked components that
operate autonomously guided by their own objectives and influenced by the behavior of the
neighbors. Even though (online) social networks are a primary example of such systems, other
remarkable typical instances can be found in Economics (e.g., markets), Physics (e.g., Ising
model and spin systems) and Biology (e.g., evolution of life). A common feature of these sys-
tems is that the behavior of each component depends only on the interactions with a limited
number of other components (its neighbors) and these interactions are usually very simple.
Game Theory is the main tool used to model the behavior of agents that are guided by their
own objective in contexts where their gains depend also on the choices made by neighboring
agents. Game theoretic approaches have been often proposed for modeling phenomena in a
complex social network, such as the formation of the social network itself [22, 7, 3, 16, 13, 12, 11],
the formation of opinions [24, 9, 17] and the spread of innovation [37, 38, 32]. Many of these
models are based on local interaction games [33], where agents are represented as vertices on
a social graph and the relationship between two agents is represented by a simple two-player
game played on the edge joining the corresponding vertices.
We are interested in the dynamics that govern such phenomena and several dynamics have
been studied in the literature like, for example, the best response dynamics [19], the logit
dynamics [10], fictitious play [18] or no-regret dynamics [21]. Any such dynamics can be seen
as made of two components:
• Selection rule: by which the set of players that update their state (strategy) is determined;
• Update rule: by which the selected players update their strategy.
For example, the classical best response dynamics compose the best response update rule with a
selection rule that selects one player at the time. In the best response update rule, the selected
player picks the strategy that, given the current strategies of the other players, guarantees the
highest utility. The Cournot dynamics [14] instead combine the best response update rule with
the selection rule that selects all players. Other dynamics in which all players concurrently
update their strategy are fictitious play [18] and the no-regret dynamics [21].
In this paper, we study a specific class of randomized update rules called the logit choice
function [29, 10, 36] which is a type of noisy best response that models in a clean and tractable
way the limited knowledge (or bounded rationality) of the players in terms of a parameter β
called inverse noise. In similar models studied in Physics, β is the inverse of the temperature.
Intuitively, a low value of β (that is, high temperature) models a noisy scenario in which players
choose their strategies “nearly at random”; a high value of β (that is, low temperature) models a
scenario with little noise in which players pick the strategies yielding higher payoffs with higher
probability.
The logit choice function can be coupled with different selection rules so to give different
dynamics. For example, in the logit dynamics [10] at every time step a single player is selected
uniformly at random and the selected player updates her strategy according to the logit choice
function. The remaining players are not allowed to revise their strategies in this time step. One
of the appealing features of the logit dynamics is that it naturally describes an ergodic Markov
chain. This means that the underlying Markov chain admits a unique stationary distribution
which we take as solution concept. This distribution describes the long-run behavior of the
system (which states appear more frequently over a long run). The interplay between the noise
and the underlying game naturally determines the system behavior: (i) As the noise becomes
“very large” the equilibrium point is “approximately” the uniform distribution; (ii) As the noise
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vanishes the stationary distribution concentrates on so called stochastically stable states [34]
which, for certain classes of games, correspond to pure Nash equilibria [10, 1].
While the logit choice function is a very natural behavioral model for approximately rational
agents, the specific selection rule that selects one single player per time step avoids any form of
concurrency. Therefore a natural question arises
What happens if concurrent updates are allowed?
For example, it is easy to construct games for which the best response converges to a Nash
equilibrium when only one player is selected at each step and does not converge to any state
when more players are chosen to concurrently update their strategies.
In this paper we study how the logit choice function behave in an extreme case of concur-
rency. Specifically, we couple this update rule with a selection rule by which all players update
their strategies at every time step. We call such dynamics all-logit, as opposed to the classical
(one-)logit dynamics in which only one player at a time is allowed to move. Roughly speaking,
the all-logit are to the one-logit what the Cournot dynamics are to the best response dynamics.
Our contributions. We study the all-logit dynamics for local interaction games [33, 15, 32].
Here players are vertices of a graph, called the social graph, and each edge is a two-player (exact)
potential game. We remark that games played on different edges by a player may be different
but, nonetheless, they have the same strategy set for the player. Each player picks one strategy
that is used for all of her edges and the payoff is a (weighted) sum of the payoffs obtained from
each game. This class of games includes coordination games on a network [15] that have been
used to model the spread of innovation and of new technology in social networks [37, 38], and
the Ising model [28], a model for magnetism. In particular, we study the all-logit dynamics on
local interaction games for every possible value of the inverse noise β and we are interested on
properties of the original one-logit dynamics that are preserved by the all-logit.
As a warm-up, we discuss two classical two-player games (these are trivial local interaction
games played on a graph with two vertices and one edge): the coordination game and the
prisoner’s dilemma. Even though for both games the stationary distribution of the one-logit
and of the all-logit are quite different, we identify three similarities. First, for both games, both
Markov chains are reversible. Moreover, for both games, the expected number of players playing
a certain strategy at the stationarity of the all-logit is exactly the same as if the expectation
was taken on the stationary distribution of the one-logit. Finally, for these games the mixing
time is asymptotically the same regardless of the selection rule. In this paper we will show that
none of these findings is accidental.
We first study the reversibility of the all-logit dynamics, an important property of stochastic
processes that is useful also to obtain explicit formulas for the stationary distribution. We
characterize the class of games for which the all-logit dynamics (that is, the Markov chain
resulting from the all-logit dynamics) are reversible and it turns out that this class coincides
with the class of local interaction games. This implies that the all-logit dynamics of all two-
player potential games are reversible; whereas not all potential games have reversible all-logit
dynamics. This is to be compared with the well-known result saying that one-logit dynamics
of every potential game are reversible with respect to the Gibbs measure [10]. One of the tools
we develop for our characterization yields a closed formula for the stationary distribution of
reversible all-logit dynamics.
Then, we focus on the observables of local interaction games. An observable is a function
of the strategy profile (that is the sequence of strategies adopted by the players) and we are
interested in its expected values at stationarity for both the one-logit and the all-logit. A
prominent example of observable is the difference Diff between the number of players adopting
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two given strategies in a game. In a local interaction game modeling the spread of innovation
on a social network this observable counts the difference between the number of adopters of the
new and old technology whereas in the Ising model it is the magnetic field of a magnet.
We show that there exists a class of observables whose expectation at stationarity of the
all-logit is the same as the expectation at stationarity of the one-logit as long as the social
network underlying the local interaction game is bipartite (and thus trivially for all two-player
games). This class of observables includes the Diff observable. It is interesting to note that
the Ising game has been mainly studied for bipartite graphs (e.g., the two-dimensional and
the three-dimensional lattice). This implies that, for the Ising model, the all-logit dynamics
are compatible with the observations and it is arguably more natural than the one-logit (that
postulate that at any given time step only one particle updates its status and that the update
strategy is instantaneously propagated). We extend this result by showing that for general
graphs, the extent at which the expectations of these observables differ can be upper and lower
bounded by a function of β and of the distance of the social graph from a bipartite graph.
Finally, we give the first bounds on the mixing time of the all-logit. We start by giving a
general upper bound on the mixing time of the all-logit in terms of the cumulative utility of
the game. We then look at two specific classes of games: graphical coordination games and
games with a dominant profile. For graphical coordination games, we prove an upper bound
to the mixing time that exponentially depends on β. Note that it is known [5] that the one-
logit also take a time exponential in β for converging to the stationary distribution. For games
with a dominant profile, we instead prove that the mixing time can be bounded by a function
independent from β. Thus, also for these games the mixing time of the all-logit has the same
behavior of the one-logit mixing time.
Related works on logit dynamics. The all-logit dynamics for strategic games have been
studied by Alos-Ferrer and Netzer [1]. Specifically, in [1] the authors study the logit-choice
function combined with general selection rules (including the selection rule of the all-logit) and
investigate conditions for which a state is stochastically stable. A stochastically stable state is
a state that has non-zero probability as β goes to infinity [34]. We focus instead on a specific
selection rule that is used by several remarkable dynamics considered in Game Theory (Cournot,
fictitious play, and no-regret) and consider the whole range of values of β.
The one-logit dynamics have been actively studied starting from the work of Blume [10]
that showed that for 2 × 2 coordination games, the risk dominant equilibria (see [20]) are
stochastically stable. Much work has been devoted to the study of the one-logit for local
interaction games with the aim of modeling and understanding the spread of innovation in a
social network [15, 38]. A general upper bound on the mixing time of the one-logit dynamics
for this class of games is given by Berger et al. [8]. Montanari and Saberi [32] instead studied
the hitting time of the highest potential configuration and relate this quantity to a connectivity
property of the underlying network. Asadpour and Saberi [4] considered the same problem for
congestion games. The mixing time and the metastability of the one-logit dynamics for strategic
games have been studied in [5, 6].
2 Definitions
In this section we formally define the local interaction games and the Markov chain induced by
the all-logit dynamics.
Strategic games. Let G = ([n], S1, . . . , Sn, u1, . . . , un) be a finite normal-form strategic game.
The set [n] = {1, . . . , n} is the player set, Si is the set of strategies for player i ∈ [n], S =
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S1 × S2 × · · · × Sn is the set of strategy profiles and ui : S → R is the utility function of player
i ∈ [n].
We adopt the standard game-theoretic notation and denote by S−i the set S−i = S1× . . .×
Si−1 × Si+1 × . . . Sn and, for x = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn) ∈ S−i and y ∈ Si, we denote by
(x, y) the strategy profile (x1, . . . , xi−1, y, xi+1, . . . , xn) ∈ S. Also, for a subset L ⊆ [n] and
strategy profile x, we denote by xL the components of x corresponding to players in L.
Potential games. We say that function Φ: S → R is an exact potential (or simply a potential)
for game G if for every i ∈ [n] and every x ∈ S−i
ui(x, y) − ui(x, z) = Φ(x, z) − Φ(x, y)
for all y, z ∈ Si. A game G that admits a potential is called a potential game [31].
The following is an important characterization of potential games in terms of the utilities.
A circuit ω = 〈s0, . . . , sℓ〉 of length ℓ is a sequence of strategy profiles such that s0 = sℓ, sh 6= sk
for 1 6 h 6= k 6 ℓ and, for k = 1, . . . , ℓ, there exists player ik such that sk−1 and sk differ only
for player ik. For such a circuit ω we define the utility improvement I(ω) as
I(ω) =
ℓ∑
k=1
[uik(sk)− uik(sk−1)] .
The following theorem then holds.
Theorem 2.1 ([31, Thm 2.8]). A game G is a potential game if and only if I(ω) = 0 for all
circuits of length 4.
Local interaction games. In a local interaction game G, each player i, with strategy set Si, is
represented by a vertex of a graph G = (V,E) (called social graph). For every edge e = (i, j) ∈ E
there is a two-players game Ge with potential function Φe in which the set of strategies of
endpoints are exactly Si and Sj. We denote with u
e
i the utility function of player i in the game
Ge. Given a strategy profile x, the utility function of player i in the local interaction game G
sets
ui(x) =
∑
e=(i,j)
uei (xi, xj).
It is easy to check that the function Φ =
∑
eΦe is a potential function for the local interaction
game G. Note that we assume that the graph G is unweighted. However, it is immediate to see
that weights do not give any modeling power.
Logit choice function. We study the interaction of n players of a strategic game G that
update their strategy according to the logit choice function [29, 10, 36] described as follows:
from profile x ∈ S player i ∈ [n] updates her strategy to y ∈ Si with probability
σi(y | x) = e
βui(x−i,y)∑
z∈Si
eβui(x−i,z)
. (1)
In other words, the logit choice function leans towards strategies promising higher utility. The
parameter β > 0 is a measure of how much the utility influences the choice of the player.
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All-logit. In this paper we consider the all-logit dynamics, by which all players concurrently
update their strategy using the logit choice function. Most of the previous works have focused
on dynamics where at each step one player is chosen uniformly at random and she updates her
strategy by following the logit choice function. We call those dynamics one-logit, to distinguish
it from the all-logit.
The all-logit dynamics induce a Markov chain over the set of strategy profiles whose tran-
sition probability P (x,y) from profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) to profile y = (y1, . . . , yn) is
P (x,y) =
n∏
i=1
σi(yi | x) = e
β
∑n
i=1 ui(x−i,yi)∏n
i=1
∑
z∈Si
eβui(x−i,z)
. (2)
Sometimes it is useful to write the transition probability from x to y in terms of the cumulative
utility of x with respect to y defined as U(x,y) =
∑
i ui(x−i, yi). Indeed, by observing that
n∏
i=1
∑
z∈Si
eβui(x−i,z) =
∑
z∈S
n∏
i=1
eβui(x−i,zi),
we can rewrite (2) as
P (x,y) =
eβU(x,y)
T (x)
, (3)
where T (x) =
∑
z∈S e
βU(x,z). For a potential game G with potential Φ, we define for each pair
of profiles (x,y) the quantity
K(x,y) =
∑
i
Φ(x−i, yi)− (n− 2)Φ(x) = 2Φ(x) +
∑
i
(Φ(x−i, yi)− Φ(x)) . (4)
Simple algebraic manipulations show that, for a potential game, we can rewrite the transition
probabilities in (3) as
P (x,y) =
e−βK(x,y)
γA(x)
,
where γA(x) =
∑
z∈S e
−βK(x,z).
It is easy to see that a Markov chain with transition matrix (2) is ergodic. Indeed, for
example, ergodicity follows from the fact that all entries of the transition matrix are strictly
positive.
Reversibility, Observables, Mixing time. In this work we focus on three features of the
all-logit dynamics, that we formally define here.
Let M be a Markov chain with transition matrix P and state set S. M is reversible with
respect to a distribution π if, for every pair of states x, y ∈ S, the following detailed balance
condition holds
π(x)P (x, y) = π(y)P (y, x). (5)
It is easy to see that if M is reversible with respect to π then π is also stationary.
An observable O is a function O : S → R, i.e. it is a function that assigns a value to each
strategy profile of the game.
An ergodic Markov chain has a unique stationary distribution π and for every starting profile
x the distribution P t(x, ·) of the chain at time t converges to π as t goes to infinity. The mixing
time is a measure of how long it takes to get close to the stationary distribution from the
worst-case starting profile, and it is defined as
tmix(ε) = inf
{
t ∈ N :
∥∥P t(x, ·) − π∥∥
TV
6 ε for all x ∈ S} ,
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where
∥∥P t(x, ·) − π∥∥
TV
= 12
∑
y∈S |P t(x,y) − π(y)| is the total variation distance. We will
usually use tmix for tmix(1/4). We refer the reader to [26] for a more detailed description of
notational conventions about Markov chains and mixing times.
3 Warm-up: two-player games
In this section we compare the behavior of the one- and the all-logit dynamics for two simple two-
player potential games (thus two simple local information games): a coordination game and the
Prisoner’s Dilemma. The analysis of these games highlights that the stationary distribution
of the two dynamics can significantly differ. However, it turns out that for both games the
Markov chain induced by the all-logit is reversible, just as for the one-logit dynamics. More
surprisingly, we see that the expected number of players taking a certain action in each one
of these games is exactly the same regardless whether the expectation is taken according the
stationary distribution of the all-logit or of the one-logit. Finally, we observe that the mixing
time of the all-logit dynamics is asymptotically the same than the mixing time of the one-logit.
Next sections will show that these results are not accidental.
Two-player coordination games. These are games in which the players have an advantage
in selecting the same strategy. They are often used to model the spread of a new technology
[38]: two players have to decide whether to adopt or not a new technology. Each player prefers
to adopt the same technology as the other player. We denote by −1 the strategy of adopting the
new technology and by +1 the strategy of adopting the old technology. The game is formally
described by the following payoff matrix
− +
− a, a c, d
+ d, c b, b
(6)
We assume that a > d and b > c (meaning that players prefer to coordinate) and that a− d =
b− c = ∆ (meaning that there is not a risk dominant strategy [18]). It is easy to see that this
game is a potential game. It is well known that the stationary distribution of the one-logit of
a potential game is the Gibbs distribution, that assigns to x ∈ S probability e−βΦ(x)/Z, where
Z =
∑
x∈S e
−βΦ(x) is the partition function.
The transition matrix of the Markov chain induced by the all-logit dynamics is
P =


−− −+ +− ++
−− (1− p)2 p(1− p) p(1− p) p2
−+ (1− p)p p2 (1− p)2 (1− p)p
+− p(1− p) (1− p)2 p2 p(1− p)
++ p2 p(1− p) p(1− p) (1− p)2


where p = 1/(1 + e∆β). Observe that this transition matrix is doubly-stochastic, that implies
that the stationary distribution of the all-logit is uniform (and hence very different from the
one-logit case). However, it is easy to check that the chain is reversible and the mixing time is
Θ
(
e∆β
)
(as in the one-logit case). Moreover, the expected number of players adopting the new
strategy at stationarity is +1, both when considering the one- and the all-logit dynamics.
Prisoner’s Dilemma. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game is described by the payoff matrix given
in (6), where with −1 we denote the strategy Confess and with +1 the strategy Defect.
Moreover, payoffs satisfy the following conditions: (i) a > d (so that −− is a Nash equilibrium);
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(ii) b < c (so that ++ is not a Nash equilibrium); (iii) 2a < c+ d < 2b (so that ++ is the social
optimum and −− is the worst social profile). It is easy to check that the game is a potential
game.
The transition matrix of the Markov chain induced by the all-logit dynamics is
P =


−− −+ +− ++
−− (1− p)2 p(1− p) p(1− p) p2
−+ (1− p)(1 − q) p(1− q) q(1− p) pq
+1 (1− p)(1 − q) q(1− p) p(1− q) pq
++ (1− q)2 q(1− q) q(1− q) q2


where we let p = 1/(1 + e(a−d)β) be the probability a player does not confess given the other
player is currently confessing and q = 1/(1+e(c−b)β) be the probability a player does not confess
given the other player is currently not confessing. Note that both p and q go to 0 as β goes to
infinity.
It is easy to check that the transition matrix is reversible (as for the one-logit). The sta-
tionary distribution is
π(−−) = (1− q)
2
(1 + p− q)2 π(++) =
p2
(1 + p− q)2 π(−+) = π(+−) =
p(1− q)
(1 + p− q)2 .
Moreover, we can see that that the mixing time is upper bounded by a constant independent of
β (as for the one-logit). You may also check that the expected number of confessing prisoners
is exactly the same in the stationary distribution of the one- and of the all-logit.
4 Reversibility and stationary distribution
Reversibility is an important property of Markov chains and, in general, of stochastic processes.
Roughly speaking, for a reversible Markov chain the stationary frequency of transitions from a
state x to a state y is equal to the stationary frequency of transitions from y to x. It is easy to
see that the one-logit for a game G are reversible if and only if G is a potential game. This does
not hold for the all-logit. Indeed, we will prove that the class of games for which the all-logit
are reversible is exactly the class of local interaction games.
4.1 Reversibility criteria
As previously stated, a Markov chain M is reversible if there exists a distribution π such that
the detailed balance condition (5) is satisfied. The Kolmogorov reversibility criterion allows
us to establish the reversibility of a process directly from the transition probabilities. Before
stating the criterion, we introduce the following notation. A directed path Γ from state x ∈ S to
state y ∈ S is a sequence of states 〈x0, x1, . . . , xℓ〉 such that x0 = x and xℓ = y. The probability
P (Γ) of path Γ is defined as P (Γ) =
∏ℓ
j=1 P (xj−1, xj). The inverse of path Γ = 〈x0, x1, . . . , xℓ〉
is the path Γ−1 = 〈xℓ, xℓ−1, . . . , x0〉. Finally, a cycle C is simply a path from a state x to itself.
We are now ready to state Kolmogorov’s reversibility criterion (see, for example, [23]).
Theorem 4.1 (Kolmogorov’s Reversibility Criterion). An irreducible Markov chain M with
state space S and transition matrix P is reversible if and only if for every cycle C it holds that
P (C) = P
(
C−1
)
.
The following lemma will be very useful for proving reversibility conditions for the all-logit
dynamics and for stating a closed expression for its stationary distribution.
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Lemma 4.2. Let M be an irreducible Markov chain with transition probability P and state
space S. M is reversible if and only if for every pair of states x, y ∈ S, there exists a constant
cx,y such that for all paths Γ from x to y, it holds that
P (Γ)
P (Γ−1)
= cx,y.
Proof. Fix x, y ∈ S and consider two paths, Γ1 and Γ2, from x to y. Let C1 and C2 be the
cycles C1 = Γ1 ◦ Γ−12 and C2 = Γ2 ◦ Γ−11 , where ◦ denotes the concatenation of paths. If M
is reversible then, by the Kolmogorov Reversibility Criterion, P (C1) = P (C2) . On the other
hand,
P (C1) = P (Γ1) ·P
(
Γ−12
)
and P (C2) = P (Γ2) ·P
(
Γ−11
)
.
Thus
P (Γ1)
P
(
Γ−11
) = P (Γ2)
P
(
Γ−12
) .
For the other direction, fix z ∈ S and, for all x ∈ S, set π˜(x) = cz,x/Z, where Z =
∑
x cz,x is
the normalizing constant. Now consider any two states x, y ∈ S of M, let Γ1 be any path from
z to x and and set Γ2 = Γ1 ◦ 〈x, y〉 (that is, Γ2 is Γ1 concatenated with the edge (x, y)). We
have that
π˜(x)
π˜(y)
=
cz,x
cz,y
=
P (Γ1)
P
(
Γ−11
) · P (Γ2)
P
(
Γ−12
)
=
P (Γ1)
P
(
Γ−11
) · P
(
Γ−11
) · P (y, x)
P (Γ1) · P (x, y)
=
P (y, x)
P (x, y)
and therefore M is reversible with respect to π˜.
4.2 All-logit reversibility implies potential games
In this section we prove that if the all-logit for a game G are reversible then G is a potential
game.
The following lemma shows a condition on the cumulative utility of a game G that is neces-
sary and sufficient for the reversibility of the all-logit of G.
Lemma 4.3. The all-logit for game G are reversible if and only if the following property holds
for every x,y, z ∈ S:
U(x,y) − U(y,x) =
(
U(x, z) + U(z,y)
)
−
(
U(y, z) + U(z,x)
)
. (7)
Proof. To prove the only if part, pick any three x,y, z ∈ S and consider paths Γ1 = 〈x,y〉
Γ2 = 〈x, z,y〉. From Lemma 4.2 we have that reversibility implies
P (Γ1)
P
(
Γ−11
) = P (Γ2)
P
(
Γ−12
)
whence
eβU(x,y)
T (x)
T (y)
eβU(y,x)
=
eβU(x,z)
T (x)
eβU(z,y)
T (z)
T (y)
eβU(y,z)
T (z)
eβU(z,x)
.
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which in turn implies (7).
As for the if part, let us fix state z ∈ S and define π˜(x) = P (z,x)Z·P (x,z) , where Z is the normalizing
constant. For any x,y ∈ S, we have
π˜(x)
π˜(y)
=
P (z,x)
P (x, z)
· P (y, z)
P (z,y)
=
eβU(z,x)
eβU(x,z)
· e
βU(y,z)
eβU(z,y)
· T (x)
T (y)
=
eβU(y,x)
eβU(x,y)
· T (x)
T (y)
=
P (y,x)
P (x,y)
,
where the first equality follows from the definition of π˜, the second and the fourth follow from
(3) and the third follows from (7). Therefore, the detailed balance equation holds for π˜ and
thus the Markov chain is reversible.
We are now ready to prove that the all-logit are reversible only for potential games.
Proposition 4.4. If the all-logit for game G are reversible then G is a potential game.
Proof. We show that if the all-logit are reversible then the utility improvement I(ω) over any
circuit ω of length 4 is 0. The theorem then follows by Theorem 2.1.
Consider circuit ω = 〈x, z,y,w,x〉 and let i be the player in which x and z differ and let j
be the player in which z and y differ. Then y and w differ in player i and w and x differ in
player j. In other words, z = (x−i, yi) = (y−j , xj) and w = (x−i, yj) = (y−i, xi). Therefore we
have that
U(x,y) =
∑
k 6=i,j uk(x) + ui(z) + uj(w) U(y,x) =
∑
k 6=i,j uk(y) + ui(w) + uj(z)
U(x, z) =
∑
k 6=i,j uk(x) + ui(z) + uj(x) U(z,y) =
∑
k 6=i,j uk(z) + ui(z) + uj(y)
U(y, z) =
∑
k 6=i,j uk(y) + ui(y) + uj(z) U(z,x) =
∑
k 6=i,j uk(z) + ui(x) + uj(z)
By plugging the above expressions into (7) and rearranging terms, we obtain(
ui(z)− ui(x)
)
+
(
uj(y) − uj(z)
)
+
(
ui(w)− ui(y)
)
+
(
uj(x)− uj(w)
)
= 0
which shows I(ω) = 0.
4.3 A necessary and sufficient condition for all-logit reversibility
In the previous section we have established that the all-logit are reversible only for potential
games and therefore, from now on, we only consider potential games G with potential function Φ.
In this section we present in Proposition 4.5 a necessary and sufficient condition for reversibility
that involves only the potential function. The condition will then be used in the next section
to prove that local interaction games are exactly the games whose all-logit are reversible.
Proposition 4.5. The all-logit for a game G with potential Φ are reversible if and only if, for
all strategy profiles x,y ∈ S,
K(x,y) = K(y,x), (8)
where K is as defined in (4).
Proof. If K(x,y) = K(y,x), then
∑
i
(
Φ(y−i, xi)− Φ(y)
)
−
∑
i
(
Φ(x−i, yi)− Φ(x)
)
= 2
(
Φ(x)− Φ(y)
)
.
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Hence, for any pair of strategy profiles x,y we have
U(x,y) − U(y,x) = n
(
Φ(x)− Φ(y)
)
+
∑
i
(
ui(x−i, yi)− ui(x)
)
−
∑
i
(
ui(y−i, xi)− ui(y)
)
= n
(
Φ(x)− Φ(y)
)
+
∑
i
(
Φ(y−i, xi)− Φ(y)
)
−
∑
i
(
Φ(x−i, yi)− Φ(x)
)
= (n+ 2)
(
Φ(x)− Φ(y)
)
.
It is then immediate to check that (7) holds.
As for the other direction, we proceed by induction on the Hamming distance between x and
y. Let x and y be two profiles at Hamming distance 1; that is, x and y differ in only one player,
say j. This implies that (yj ,x−j) = y and (xj ,y−j) = x. Moreover, for i 6= j, (yi,x−i) = x and
(xi,y−i) = y. Thus,
K(x,y) −K(y,x) =
∑
i
(
Φ(yi,x−i)− Φ(xi,y−i)
)
− (n− 2)
(
Φ(x)− Φ(y)
)
=
(
Φ(yj ,x−j)− Φ(xj ,y−j)
)
+
∑
i 6=j
(
Φ(yi,x−i)− Φ(xi,y−i)
)
− (n − 2)
(
Φ(x)− Φ(y)
)
=
(
Φ(y) − Φ(x)
)
+ (n− 1)
(
Φ(x)− Φ(y)
)
− (n− 2)
(
Φ(x)−Φ(y)
)
= 0.
Now assume that the claim holds for any pair of profiles at Hamming distance k < n and let
x and y be two profiles at distance k + 1. Let j be any player such that xj 6= yj and let
z = (yj ,x−j): z is at distance at most k from x and from y. Consider paths Γ1 = 〈x,y〉 and
Γ2 = 〈x, z,y〉. From Lemma 4.2 we have that reversibility implies
eβK(x,y)
γA(x)
γA(y)
eβK(y,x)
=
eβK(x,z)
γA(x)
eβK(z,y)
γA(z)
γA(y)
eβK(y,z)
γA(z)
eβK(z,x)
.
Hence K(x,y) −K(y,x) =
(
K(x, z) −K(z,x)
)
+
(
K(y, z) −K(z,y)
)
and the thesis follows
from the inductive hypothesis.
4.4 Reversibility and local interaction games
Here we prove that the games whose all-logit are reversible are exactly the local interaction
games.
A potential Φ : S1 × · · · × Sn → R is a two-player potential if there exist u, v ∈ [n] such
that, for any x,y ∈ S with xu = yu and xv = yv we have Φ(x) = Φ(y). In other words, Φ is
a function of only its u-th and v-th argument. An interesting fact about two-player potential
games is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 4.6. Any two-player potential satisfies (8).
Proof. Let Φ be a two-player potential and let u and v be its two players. Then we have that for
w 6= u, v, Φ(yw,x−w) = Φ(x) and that Φ(yu,x−u) = Φ(xv,y−v) and Φ(yv,x−v) = Φ(xu,y−u).
Thus
K(x,y) = Φ(yu,x−u) + Φ(yv,x−v)
and
K(y,x) = Φ(xv,y−v) + Φ(xu,y−u) = Φ(yu,x−u) + Φ(yv,x−v).
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We say that a potential Φ is the sum of two-player potentials if there exist N two-player
potentials Φ1, . . . ,ΦN such that Φ = Φ1 + · · ·+ΦN . It is easy to see that generality is not lost
by further requiring that 1 6 l 6= l′ 6 N implies (ul, vl) 6= (ul′ , vl′), where ul and vl are the two
players of potential Φl. At every game G whose potential is the sum of two-player potentials,
i.e., Φ = Φ1 + · · · +ΦN , we can associate a social graph G that has a vertex for each player of
G and has edge (u, v) iff there exists l such that potential Φl depends on players u and v. In
other words, each game whose potential is the sum of two-player potentials is a local interaction
game.
Observe that the sum of two potentials satisfying (8) also satisfies (8). Hence we have the
following proposition.
Proposition 4.7. The all-logit dynamics for a local interaction game are reversible.
Next we prove that if an n-player potential Φ satisfies (8) then it can be written as the sum
of at most N =
(n
2
)
two-player potentials, Φ1, . . . ,ΦN and thus it represents a local interaction
game. We do so by describing an effective procedure that constructs theN two-player potentials.
Let us fix a strategy w⋆i for each player i and denote as w
⋆ the strategy profile (w⋆1, . . . , w
⋆
n).
Moreover, we fix an arbitrary ordering (u1, v1), . . . , (uN , vN ) of the N unordered pairs of players.
For a potential Φ we define the sequence ϑ0, . . . , ϑN of potentials as follows: ϑ0 = Φ and, for
i = 1, . . . , N , set
ϑi = ϑi−1 − Φi (9)
where, for x ∈ S, Φi(x) is defined as
Φi(x) = ϑi−1(xui , xvi ,w
⋆
−uivi).
Observe that, for i = 1, . . . , N , Φi is a two-player potential and its players are ui and vi. From
Lemma 4.6, Φi satisfies (8). Hence, if Φ satisfies (8), then also ϑi, for i = 1, . . . , N , satisfies (8).
By summing for i = 1, . . . , N in (9) we obtain
N∑
i=1
ϑi =
N−1∑
i=0
ϑi −
N∑
i=1
Φi.
Thus
Φ− ϑN =
N∑
i=1
Φi.
The next two lemmas prove that, if Φ satisfies (8), then ϑN is identically zero. This implies that
Φ is the sum of at most N non-zero two-player potentials and thus a local interaction game.
A ball B(r,x) of radius r 6 n centered in x ∈ S is the subset of S containing all profiles y
that differ from x in at most r coordinates.
Lemma 4.8. For any n-player potential function Φ and for any ordering of the pairs of players,
ϑN (x) = 0 for every x ∈ B(2,w⋆).
Proof. We distinguish three cases based on the distance of x from w⋆.
x = w⋆: for every i > 1, we have
ϑi(w
⋆) = ϑi−1(w
⋆)− Φi(w⋆) = ϑi−1(w⋆)− ϑi−1(w⋆) = 0.
x is at distance 1 from w⋆: That is, there exists u ∈ [n] such that x = (xu,w⋆−u), with xu 6= w⋆u.
Let us denote by t(u) the smallest t such that the t-th pair contains u. We next show that for
i > t(u), ϑi(x) = 0. Indeed, we have that if u is a component of the i-th pair then
ϑi(x) = ϑi−1(x) −Φi(x) = ϑi−1(x) − ϑi−1(x) = 0;
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On the other hand, if u is not a component of the i-th pair then
ϑi(x) = ϑi−1(x)− Φi(x) = ϑi−1(x)− ϑi−1(w⋆) = ϑi−1(x);
x is at distance 2 from w⋆: That is, there exist u and v such that x = (xu, xv ,w
⋆
−uv), with
xu 6= w⋆u and xv 6= w⋆v . Let t be the index of the pair (u, v). Notice that t > t(u), t(v). We show
that ϑt(x) = 0 and that this value does not change for all i > t. Indeed, we have
ϑt(x) = ϑt−1(x)− Φt(x) = ϑt−1(x)− ϑt−1(x) = 0;
If instead neither of u and v belongs to the i-th pair, with i > t, then we have
ϑi(x) = ϑi−1(x)− Φi(x) = ϑi−1(x)− ϑi−1(w⋆) = ϑi−1(x);
Finally, suppose that the i-th pair, for i > t, contains exactly one of u and v, say u. Then we
have
ϑi(x) = ϑi−1(x)− Φi(x) = ϑi−1(x)− ϑi−1(xu,w⋆−u).
We conclude the proof by observing that t(u) 6 t 6 i − 1 and thus, by the previous case,
ϑi−1(xu,w
⋆
−u) = 0.
The next lemma shows that if a potential ϑ satisfies (8) and is constant in a ball of radius
2, then it is constant everywhere.
Lemma 4.9. Let ϑ be a function that satisfies (8). If there exist x ∈ S and c ∈ R such that
ϑ(y) = c for every y ∈ B(2,x), then ϑ(y) = c for every y ∈ S.
Proof. Fix h > 2 and suppose that ϑ(z) = c for every z ∈ B(h− 1,x). Consider y ∈ B(h,x) \
B(h− 1,x) and observe that (yi,x−i) ∈ B(h− 1,x) and (xi,y−i) ∈ B(h− 1,x) for every i such
that xi 6= yi. Then, since ϑ satisfies (8), we have
(h− 2) (ϑ(x)− ϑ(y)) =
∑
i : xi 6=yi
(
ϑ(yi,x−i)− ϑ(xi,y−i)
)
= 0,
that implies ϑ(y) = ϑ(x) = c.
We can thus conclude that if the all-logit of a potential game G are reversible then G is a
local interaction game. By combining this result with Proposition 4.4 and Proposition 4.7, we
obtain
Theorem 4.10. The all-logit dynamics of game G are reversible if and only if G is a local
interaction game.
As a corollary of this theorem we have a closed form for the stationary distribution of the
all-logit for local interaction games.
Corollary 4.11 (Stationary distribution). Let G be a local interaction game with potential
function Φ. Then the stationary distribution of the all-logit for G is
πA(x) ∝
∑
y∈S
e−βK(x,y). (10)
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Proof. Fix any profile y. The detailed balance equation gives for every x ∈ S
πA(x)
πA(y)
=
P (y,x)
P (x,y)
= eβ(K(x,y)−K(y,x))
γA(x)
γA(y)
.
By Proposition 4.5 we have
πA(x) = γA(x) · πA(y)
γA(y)
.
Since the term πA(y)γA(y) is constant for each profile x, the claim follows.
Note that for a local interaction game G with potential function Φ, we write π1(x), the
stationary distribution of the one-logit of G, as π1(x) = γ1(x)/Z1 where γ1(x) = e−βΦ(x) is the
Boltzmann factor and Z1 =
∑
x
γ1(x) is the partition function. From Corollary 4.11, we derive
that πA(x), the stationary distribution of the all-logit of G, can be written in similar way; that
is, πA(x) =
γA(x)
ZA
, where γA(x) =
∑
y
e−βK(x,y) and
ZA =
∑
x∈S
γA(x) =
∑
x,y∈S
e−βK(x,y).
The ZA factor can thus be considered as the partition function of the all-logit.
5 Observables of local information games
In this section we study observables of local interaction games and we focus on the relation
between the expected value 〈O,π1〉 of an observable O at the stationarity of the one-logit and
its expected value 〈O,πA〉 at the stationarity of the all-logit dynamics. We start by study-
ing invariant observables, that is, observables for which the two expected values coincide. In
Theorem 5.6, we give a sufficient condition for an observable to be invariant. The sufficient
condition is related to the existence of a decomposition of the set S × S that decomposes the
quantity K appearing in the expression for the stationary distribution of the all-logit of the
local interaction game G (see Eq. 10) into a sum of two potentials. In Theorem 5.6 we show
that if G admits such a decomposition µ and in addition observable O is also decomposed by
µ (see Definition 5.2) then O has the same expected value at the stationarity of the one-logit
and of the all-logit. We then go on to show that all local interaction games on bipartite social
graphs admit a decomposition permutation (see Theorem 5.4) and give examples of invariant
observables.
We then look at local interaction games G on general social graphs G and show that the
expected values of a decomposable observable O with respect to the stationary distributions of
the one-logit and of the all-logit differ by a quantity that depends on β and on how far away
the social graph G is from being bipartite (which in turn is related to the smallest eigenvalue
of G [35]).
The above findings follow from a relation between the partition functions of the one-logit
and of the all-logit that might be of independent interest. More precisely, in Theorem 5.1 we
show that if the game G admits a decomposition then the partition function of the all-logit is
the square of the partition function of the one-logit. The partition function of the one-logit is
easily seen to be equal to the partition function of the canonical ensemble used in Statistical
Mechanics (see for example [25]). It is well known that a partition function of a canonical
ensemble that is the union of two independent canonical ensembles is the product of the two
partition functions. Thus Theorem 5.1 (and Corollary 5.5) can be seen as a further confirmation
that the all-logit can be decomposed into two independent one-logit dynamics.
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5.1 Decomposable observables for bipartite social graphs
We start by introducing the concept of a decomposition and we prove that for all local interaction
games on a bipartite social graph there exists a decomposition. Then we define the concept of
a decomposable observable and prove that a decomposable observable has the same expectation
at stationarity for the one-logit and the all-logit.
Definition 5.1. A permutation
µ : (x,y) 7→ (µ1(x,y), µ2(x,y))
of S×S is a decomposition for a local interaction game G with potential Φ if, for all (x,y), we
have that
K(x,y) = Φ(µ1(x,y)) + Φ(µ2(x,y)),
µ1(x,y) = µ2(y,x) and µ2(x,y) = µ1(y,x).
Observe that if µ decomposes local interaction game G then
πA(x) =
∑
y
π1(µ1(x,y)) · π1(µ2(x,y))
We first show a relation between the partition functions of the one-logit and of the all-logit
that might be of independent interest.
Theorem 5.1. If a local interaction game G admits a decomposition µ then ZA = Z21 .
Proof. From (10) and from the fact that µ is a permutation of S × S, we have
ZA =
∑
x,y
e−βK(x,y) =
∑
x,y
e−β[Φ(µ1(x,y))+Φ(µ2(x,y))] =
∑
x,y
e−β[Φ(x)+Φ(y)] = Z21 .
We next prove that for all local interaction games on a bipartite social graph there exists
a decomposition. We start by showing that we can decompose K(x,y) in the contributions of
each edge of the social graph G of the local interaction game G. Specifically, for strategy profiles
x and y and edge e = (u, v) of G we define Ke(x,y) as
Ke(x,y) = Φe(xu, yv) + Φe(yu, xv). (11)
Then we have the following lemma that will be useful for giving a sufficient condition for having
a decomposition.
Lemma 5.2.
K(x,y) =
∑
e
Ke(x,y).
Proof. By definition K(x,y) =
∑
iΦ(x−i, yi) − (n − 2)Φ(x). Then by expressing Φ as sum of
the potential over the edges we have
K(x,y) =
∑
i
∑
e
Φe(x−i, yi)− (n− 2)Φ(x).
Then observe that edge e = (u, v) and each of the (n− 2) vertices i 6= u, v contribute Φe(xu, xv)
to the sum. On the other hand, the total contribution for e = (u, v) and i = u, v is Ke(x,y) =
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Φe(yu, xv) + Φe(xu, yv). Therefore we obtain
K(x,y) =
∑
i
∑
e=(u,v)
Φe(x−i, yi)− (n− 2)Φ(x)
=
∑
e=(u,v)
[(n− 2)Φe(xu, xv) +Ke(x,y)] − (n− 2)Φ(x)
=
∑
e
Ke(x,y).
From Lemma 5.2, we then achieve the following sufficient condition for a permutation to be
a decomposition.
Lemma 5.3. Let G be a local interaction game with potential Φ on a graph G. Consider a
permutation (x,y) 7→ (x˜, y˜) such that for all x,y ∈ S and for each edge e = (u, v) of G at least
one of the following equalities holds
(x˜u, x˜v, y˜u, y˜v) = (xu, yv, yu, xv), (12)
(x˜u, x˜v, y˜u, y˜v) = (yu, xv, xu, yv). (13)
Then, K(x,y) = φ(x˜) + φ(y˜).
Proof. Observe that, if one of Equation (12) and (13) holds,
Φe(x˜u, x˜v) + Φe(y˜u, y˜v) = Φe(xu, yv) + Φe(yu, xv) = Ke(x,y).
The corollary then follows by summing over all edges e.
We are now ready for the main result of the section.
Theorem 5.4. Let G be a local interaction game on a bipartite graph G. Then G admits a
decomposition.
Proof. Let (L,R) be the sets of vertices in which G is bipartite. For each (x,y) ∈ S × S define
x˜ = µ1(x,y) = (xL,yR) and y˜ = µ2(x,y) = (yL,xR). (14)
First of all, observe that the mapping is an involution and thus it is also a permutation
and that µ1(x,y) = µ2(y,x) and µ2(x,y) = µ1(y,x). Since G is bipartite, for every edge (u, v)
exactly one endpoint is in L and exactly one is in R. If u ∈ L, then we have that (x˜u, x˜v, y˜u, y˜v) =
(xu, yv, yu, xv) and thus (12) is satisfied. If instead u ∈ R, then we have that (x˜u, x˜v , y˜u, y˜v) =
(yu, xv, xu, yv) and thus (13) is satisfied. Therefore for each edge one of (12) and (13) is satisfied.
By Lemma 5.3, we can conclude that the mapping is a decomposition.
Consider a local interaction game on a bipartite graph G = (L,R,E) and let us denote by
L(x) (respectively, R(x)) the set of profiles agreeing with x for every vertex of L (respectively,
of R). That is, L(x) = {y : yL = xL} and R(x) = {y : yR = xR}. The following corollary of
Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.4 proves an interesting characterization of the stationary distribu-
tion of the all-logit dynamics for local interaction games on bipartite graphs that might be of
independent interest.
Corollary 5.5. Let G be a local interaction game on a bipartite graph G = (L,R,E). Then for
each profile x we have
πA(x) = π1(L(x)) · π1(R(x)).
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Proof. Observe that
π1(L(x)) · π1(R(x)) = 1
Z21
∑
(y,z)∈L(x)×R(x)
e−β(Φ(y)+Φ(z)).
For each pair (y, z) ∈ L(x) × R(x), consider the profile wy,z = (zL,yR). Then, (y, z) =
µ(x,wy,z), where µ is the decomposition (14). Note that the correspondence between pairs
(y, z) ∈ L(x) ×R(x) and profiles w is actually a bijection. Indeed, for each profile w ∈ S, the
pair (µ1(x,w), µ2(x,w)) belongs to L(x)×R(x). Hence and from Theorem 5.1, it follows that
π1(L(x)) · π1(R(x)) = 1
ZA
∑
w
e−β(Φ(µ1(x,w))+Φ(µ2(x,w))) =
1
ZA
∑
w
e−βK(x,w) = πA(x).
We now define the concept of a decomposable observable.
Definition 5.2. An observable O is decomposable for local interaction game G if there exists
a decomposition µ of G such that, for all (x,y), we have that
O(x) +O(y) = O(µ1(x,y)) +O(µ2(x,y)).
We next prove that a decomposable observable has the same expectation at stationarity of
the one-logit and the all-logit.
Theorem 5.6. If observable O is decomposable then
〈O,π1〉 = 〈O,πA〉.
Proof. Suppose that O is decomposed by µ. Then we have that, for all x ∈ S, πA(x) =∑
y
π1(µ1(x,y)) · π1(µ2(x,y)) and thus
〈O,πA〉 =
∑
x
O(x) · πA(x)
=
∑
x,y
O(x) · π1(µ1(x,y)) · π1(µ2(x,y))
=
1
2
∑
x,y
[O(x) +O(y)] · π1(µ1(x,y)) · π1(µ2(x,y))
In the last equality we have used that µ1(x,y) = µ2(y,x) and µ2(x,y) = µ1(y,x) which implies
that ∑
x,y
O(x) · π1(µ1(x,y)) · π1(µ2(x,y)) =
∑
x,y
O(y) · π1(µ1(x,y)) · π1(µ2(x,y)).
Now, since O is decomposable we have that O(x)+O(y) = O(µ1(x,y)) +O(µ2(x,y)) and thus
we can write
〈O,πA〉 = 1
2
∑
x,y
[O(µ1(x,y)) +O(µ2(x,y))] · π1(µ1(x,y)) · π1(µ2(x,y))
=
1
2
∑
x,y
[O(x) +O(y)] · π1(x) · π1(y)
=
∑
x,y
O(x) · π1(x) · π1(y)
=
∑
x
O(x) · π1(x) ·
∑
y
π1(y)
= 〈O,π1〉.
We now give examples of decomposable observables.
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The Diff observable. Let us consider the case that players have only two available strategies,
namely −1 and +1. We consider the observable Diff that returns the (signed) difference between
the number of vertices adopting the strategy −1 and the number of vertices adopting strategy
+1. That is, Diff(x) =
∑
u xu. In local interaction games used to model the diffusion of
innovation in social networks and the spread of new technology (see, for example, [38]), this
observable is a measure of how wide is the adoption of the innovation. The Diff observable
is also meaningful in the Ising model for ferromagnetism (see, for example, [28]) as it is the
measured magnetism.
To prove that Diff is decomposable we consider the mapping (14) and observe that, for every
vertex u and for every (x,y) ∈ S × S, we have xu + yu = x˜u + y˜u. Whence we conclude that
Diff(x) + Diff(y) = Diff(x˜) + Diff(y˜).
The MonoC observable. Another interesting decomposable observable is the signed difference
MonoC between the number of “−1”-monochromatic edges of the social graph (that is, edges
in which both endpoints play −1) and the number of “+1”-monochromatic edges. That is,
MonoC(x) = 12
∑
(u,v)∈E (xu + xv). Again, we consider the mapping (14) and the decomposabil-
ity of MonoC follows from the property that, for every (x,y) ∈ S×S, we have xu+yu = x˜u+ y˜u.
Corollary 5.7. Observables Diff and MonoC are decomposable and thus, for local interaction
games on bipartite social graphs,
〈Diff, π1〉 = 〈Diff, πA〉 and 〈MonoC, π1〉 = 〈MonoC, πA〉.
5.2 General graphs
Let us start by slightly generalizing concepts of decomposition and decomposable observable.
Definition 5.3. A permutation
µ : (x,y) 7→ (µ1(x,y), µ2(x,y))
of S×S is an α-decomposition for a local interaction game G with potential Φ if, for all (x,y),
we have that
|K(x,y) − Φ(µ1(x,y)) − Φ(µ2(x,y))| 6 α,
µ1(x,y) = µ2(y,x) and µ2(x,y) = µ1(y,x).
Note that a decomposition is actually a 0-decomposition (see Definition 5.1).
Definition 5.4. An observable O is α-decomposable if it is decomposed by an α-decomposition.
We prove that for all local interaction games there exists an α-decomposition with α de-
pending only on how far away the social graph G is from being bipartite. Specifically, for each
edge e of the social graph we define the weight we = maxx,y∈Ge (Φe(x)− Φe(y)), i.e., we is the
maximum difference in the potential Φe of the two-player game Ge. We say that a subset of
edges of G is bipartiting if the removal of these edges makes the graph bipartite. We will denote
with B(G) the bipartiting subset of minimum weight and with b(G) its weight. We have then
the following theorem.
Theorem 5.8. Let G be a social interaction game on a graph G. Then, for any α > 2 · b(G),
G admits an α-decomposition.
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Proof. Let us name as G′ = (L,R,E′) the bipartite graph obtained by deleting from G the
edges of B(G) and consider the mapping (14). We know this mapping is actually a permutation
and µ1(x,y) = µ2(y,x) and µ2(x,y) = µ1(y,x). We will show that, for every x,y
|K(x,y) − Φ(x˜)− Φ(y˜)| 6 2 · b(G), (15)
where x˜ = µ1(x,y) and y˜ = µ2(x,y).
Observe that K(x,y) =
∑
e∈E′ Ke(x,y) +
∑
e∈E\E′ Ke(x,y). From Theorem 5.4, for each
edge e = (u, v) ∈ E′ we have Ke(x,y) = Φe(x˜u, x˜v) + Φe(y˜u, y˜v). As for each edge e = (u, v) ∈
E \E′ we have that the endpoints are either both in L or both in R. In both cases, it turns out
that
Φe(x˜u, x˜v) + Φe(y˜u, y˜v) = Φe(xu, xv) + Φe(yu, yv).
Then we distinguish four cases:
1. yu = xu and yv = xv. In this case Ke(x,y) = 2 · Φe(xu, xv) and thus Ke(x,y) =
Φe(x˜u, x˜v) + Φe(y˜u, y˜v).
2. yu 6= xu and yv = xv. In this case Ke(x,y) = Φe(xu, xv)+Φe(yu, xv) and thus Ke(x,y) =
Φe(x˜u, x˜v) + Φe(y˜u, y˜v).
3. yu = xu and yv 6= xv. In this case Ke(x,y) = Φe(xu, xv)+Φe(xu, yv) and thus Ke(x,y) =
Φe(x˜u, x˜v) + Φe(y˜u, y˜v).
4. yu 6= xu and yv 6= xv. In this case Ke(x,y) = Φe(yu, xv) + Φe(xu, yv). Since |Φe(xu, xv)−
Φe(yu, xv)| 6 we and |Φe(yu, yv)− Φe(xu, yv)| 6 we, then
|Ke(x,y) −Φe(x˜u, x˜v)− Φe(y˜u, y˜v)| 6 2we.
By summing the contribution of every edge we achieve (15).
Note that the quantity b(G) is related to the bipartiteness ratio of G which in turn is related
to the smallest eigenvalue of G [35].
Finally, we next prove that for an α-decomposable observable the extent at which the ex-
pectations at stationarity for the one-logit and the all-logit differ depends only on α and β.
Theorem 5.9. If observable O is decomposable then
e−2αβ · 〈O,π1〉 6 〈O,πA〉 6 e2αβ · 〈O,π1〉.
Proof. By mimicking the proof of Theorem 5.1, we have e−αβZ21 6 ZA 6 e
αβZ21 and
e−αβ
∑
y
γ1(µ1(x,y)) · γ1(µ2(x,y)) 6 γA(x) 6 eαβ
∑
y
γ1(µ1(x,y)) · γ1(µ2(x,y)).
The theorem then follows from the same arguments given in the proof of Theorem 5.6.
6 Mixing time
The all-logit dynamics for a strategic game have the property that, for every pair of profiles
x,y and for every value of β, the transition probability from x to y is strictly positive. In order
to give upper bounds on the mixing time, we will use the following simple well-known lemma
(see e.g. Theorem 11.5 in [30]).
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Lemma 6.1. Let P be the transition matrix of an ergodic Markov chain with state space Ω.
For every y ∈ Ω let us name αy = min{P (x, y) : x ∈ Ω} and α =
∑
y∈Ω αy. Then the mixing
time of P is tmix = O(1/α).
We now give an upper bound holding for every game. Recall that for a strategic game G,
in Section 2 we defined the cumulative utility function for the ordered pair of profiles (x,y) as
U(x,y) =
∑n
i=1 ui(x−i, yi). Let us name ∆U the size of the range of U ,
∆U = max{U(x,y) : x,y ∈ S} −min{U(x,y) : x,y ∈ S}.
By using Lemma 6.1 we can give a simple upper bound on the mixing time of the all-logit
dynamics for G as a function of β and ∆U .
Theorem 6.2 (General upper bound). For any strategic game G the mixing time of the all-logit
dynamics for G is O (eβ∆U).
Proof. Let P be the transition matrix of the all-logit dynamics for G and let x,y ∈ S be two
profiles. From (3) we have that
P (x,y) =
eβU(x,y)∑
z∈S e
βU(x,z)
=
1∑
z∈S e
β(U(x,z)−U(x,y))
>
1
|S|eβ∆U .
Hence for every y ∈ S it holds that
αy >
e−β∆U
|S|
and α =
∑
y∈S αy > e
−β∆U . The thesis then follows from Lemma 6.1.
Next sections will give specific bounds for two specific classes of games (that contain the
games analyzed in the Section 3), namely graphical coordination games and games with a
dominant profile. These results show that the the mixing time of the all-logit dynamics has the
same twofold behavior that has been highlighted in the case of the one-logit: for some games
it depends exponentially on β, whereas for other games it can be upper-bounded by a function
independent from β.
6.1 Graphical coordination games
A graphical coordination game is a local interaction game in which on each edge is played the
the coordination game described by (6). It turns out that we can apply Theorem 6.2 in order
to give an upper bound to the mixing time of the all-logit for graphical coordination games.
Theorem 6.3. The mixing time of the all-logit for a graphical coordination game on a graph
G = (V,E) is
tmix = O
(
e2β(max{a,b}−min{c,d})|E|
)
.
Proof. Suppose that a > b. Then, consider the profile x+ in which each player plays the strategy
+1. It is easy to see that U(x,y) 6 U(x+,x+) =
∑
i a ·deg(i), where deg(i) is the degree of i in
G. The case a < b is equivalent except that we now consider the profile x− in which each player
plays the strategy −1. Similarly, suppose that c 6 d. Then U(x,y) > U(x−,x+) =
∑
i c ·deg(i).
The case d < c is equivalent except we invert the role of x− and x+. Hence
∆U =
∑
i
max{a, b} · deg(i) −
∑
i
min{c, d} · deg(i) = 2β(max{a, b} −min{c, d})|E|.
The thesis then follows from Theorem 6.2.
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This bound shows that the mixing time of the all-logit for graphical coordination games
exponentially depends on β, as in the case of the one-logit dynamics. However, the bounds
given in the previous theorem can be very loose with respect to the known results about the
mixing time of the one-logit for graphical coordination games [5]. It would be interesting to
understand at which extent the above bounds can be improved (in Appendix A we slightly
improve these bounds for a very special graphical coordination game, namely the Curie-Weiss
model for ferromagnetism adopted in Statistical Physics) and, in particular, if it is possible to
show that the mixing time of the all-logit cannot be longer than the mixing time of the one-logit.
6.2 Games with dominant strategies
Theorems 6.3 shows that for graphical coordination games the mixing time grows with β. In this
section we show that for games with a dominant profile, such as the prisoner’s dilemma analyzed
in Section 3, the time that the all-logit take for converging to the stationary distribution is upper
bounded by a function independent of β, as in the case of the one-logit dynamics [5].
Specifically, we say that strategy s⋆ ∈ Si is a dominant strategy for player i if for all s′ ∈ Si
and all strategy profiles x ∈ S,
ui(s
⋆,x−i) > ui(s
′,x−i).
A dominant profile x⋆ = (x⋆1, . . . , x
⋆
n) is a profile in which x
⋆
i is a dominant strategy for player
i = 1, . . . , n. Then, we can derive the following upper bound on the mixing time of the all-logit
dynamics for games with a dominant profile, whose proof resembles the one used for proving a
similar result for the one-logit given in [5].
Theorem 6.4. Let G be an n-player games with a dominant profile where each player has at
most m strategies. The mixing time of the all-logit for G is
tmix = O (mn) .
Proof. The proof uses the coupling technique (see, for example, Theorem 5.2 in [26]).
Let P be the transition matrix of the all-logit dynamics for G. For every pair of profiles x
and y, we consider a coupling (X,Y ) of the distributions P (x, ·) and P (y, ·) such that for every
player i the probability that both chains choose strategy s for player i is exactly min{σi(s |
x), σi(s | y)}. Observe that, with such a coupling, once the two chains coalesce, i.e. X = Y ,
they stay together.
We next observe that for all starting profiles x and y, it holds that
Px,y (X1 = Y1) > Px,y (X1 = x
⋆ and Y1 = x
⋆) >
1
mn
.
Indeed both chains are in profile x⋆ after one step if and only if every player chooses strategy
x⋆i in both chains. From the properties of the coupling, it follows that this event occurs with
probability ∏
i
min{σi(x⋆i | x), σi(x⋆i | y)} >
∏
i
1
|Si| >
1
mn
,
where the first inequality follows from (1) and the fact that x⋆i is a dominant strategy for i.
Therefore we have that the probability that the two chains have not yet coupled after k time
steps is
Px,y (Xk 6= Yk) 6
(
1− 1
mn
)k
6 e−k/m
n
,
which is less than 1/4 for k = O(mn). By applying the Coupling Theorem [26, Theorem 5.2]
we have that tmix = O (mn).
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7 Conclusions and open problems
In this paper we considered the selection rule that assigns positive probability only to the set
of all players. A natural extension of this selection rule assigns a different probability to each
subset of the players. What is the impact of such a probabilistic selection rule on reversibility
and on observables? Some interesting results along that direction have been obtained in [1, 2].
Notice that if we consider the selection rule that selects player i with probability pi > 0 (the
one-logit set pi = 1/n for all i) then the stationary distribution is the same as the stationary
distribution of the one-logit. Therefore, all observables have the same expected value and all
potential games are reversible.
It is a classical result that the Gibbs distribution that is the stationary distribution of the
one-logit (the micro-canonical ensemble, in Statistical Mechanics parlance) is the distribution
that maximizes the entropy among all the distributions with a fixed average potential. Can we
say something similar for the stationary distribution of the all-logit? A promising direction along
this line of research is suggested by results in Section 5: at least in some cases the stationary
distribution of the all-logit can be seen as a composition of simpler distributions.
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A Mixing time of the all-logit for the Curie-Weiss model
Here we prove upper and lower bounds on the mixing time of the all-logit dynamics for a special
graphical coordination game, the CW-game. In such a game we set a = b = +1 and c = d = −1.
Thus, the utility of player i ∈ [n] is the sum of the number of players playing the same strategy
as i, minus the number of players playing the opposite strategy; that is, the utility of player
i ∈ [n] at profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {−1,+1}n is
ui(x) = xi
∑
j 6=i
xj.
It is easy to see that the potential function for this game is
Φ(x) = −
∑
{i,j}∈([n]2 )
xixj .
Due to the high level of symmetry of the game, the potential of a profile x depends only on the
number of players playing ±1. Indeed, we can rewrite the potential of x as
Φ(x) = −Diff
2(x)− n
2
,
where Diff is the observable described in Section 5.1.
The upper bound. Observe that, for the Curie-Weiss model we have ∆U = 2n(n−1), hence
by using Theorem 6.3 we get directly that
tmix = O
(
e2βn(n−1)
)
. (16)
Hence it follows that mixing time is O(1) for β = O(1/n2) and it is O(poly(n)) for β =
O(log n/n2).
In what follows we show that factor “2” at the exponent in (16) can be removed and that a
slightly better upper bound can be given for β > log n/n.
Lemma A.1. For every x,y ∈ Ω it holds that
P (x,y) > q(n+|Diff(y)|)/2(1− q)(n−|Diff(y)|)/2
where
q =
1
1 + e2β(n−1)
.
Proof. Consider a profile y ∈ {−1,+1}n. Observe that the number of players playing +1 and
−1 in y can be written as n+Diff(y)2 and n−Diff(y)2 , respectively. If Diff(y) > 0, i.e. if the number
of players playing +1 is larger than the number of players playing −1, then the profile that
minimizes P (x,y) is profile x− = (−1, . . . ,−1) where every player plays −1. If we name
q =
e−β(n−1)
e−β(n−1) + eβ(n−1)
=
1
1 + e2β(n−1)
the probability that a player in x− chooses strategy +1 for the next round, we have that
P (x−,y) = q
n+Diff(y)
2 (1− q)n−Diff(y)2 .
On the other hand, if Diff(y) < 0, then P (x,y) is minimized when x = x+ = (+1, . . . ,+1) and,
since q is also the probability that a player in x+ chooses strategy −1 for the next round, we
have that
P (x+,y) = q
n−Diff(y)
2 (1− q)n+Diff(y)2
and the thesis follows.
Now we can give an upper bound on the mixing time by using lemmata 6.1 and A.1
Theorem A.2 (Upper bound). The mixing time of the all-logit dynamics for the Curie-Weiss
model is
tmix = O
(
neβn
2
)
.
If β > log n/n the mixing time is
tmix = O
(
neβn
2
2n
)
.
Proof. From Lemma A.1 it follows that for every y ∈ {−1,+1}n we have
αy = min{P (x,y) | x ∈ {−1,+1}n} > q(n+|Diff(y)|)/2(1− q)(n−|Diff(y)|)/2.
Hence
α =
∑
y∈{−1,+1}n
αy >
∑
y∈{−1,+1}n
q(n+|Diff(y)|)/2(1− q)(n−|Diff(y)|)/2. (17)
Now observe that there are
( n
n−k
2
)
profiles y such that Diff(y) = k, and since q 6 1/2, the largest
terms in (17) are the ones such that Diff(y) is as close to zero as possible. In order to give a
lower bound to α we will thus consider only profiles y such that Diff(y) = 0, when n is even,
and profiles y such that Diff(y) = ±1, when n is odd.
Case n even: If we consider only profiles y such that Diff(y) = 0 in (17) we have that
α >
(
n
n/2
)
[q(1− q)]n/2.
By using a standard lower bound for the binomial coefficient (see e.g. Lemma 9.2 in [30]) we
have that (
n
n/2
)
>
2n
n+ 1
.
As for [q(1 − q)]n/2 we have that
q(1− q) = 1
1 + e2β(n−1)
· 1
1 + e−2β(n−1)
=
1
e2β(n−1) + 2 + e−2β(n−1)
=
1
e2β(n−1)
(
1 + 2e−2β(n−1) + e−4β(n−1)
) (18)
Now observe that for every β > 0 we can bound 1 + 2e−2β(n−1) + e−4β(n−1) 6 4. Thus we have
that
[q(1− q)]n/2 > 1
2neβn(n−1)
. (19)
26
Hence
α >
(
n
n/2
)
[q(1− q)]n/2 > 1
(n+ 1)eβn(n−1)
.
And by using Lemma 6.1 we have
tmix = O
(
neβn(n−1)
)
.
If β is large enough, say β > log n/n, in (18) we can bound
1 + 2e−2β(n−1) + e−4β(n−1) 6 1 +
1
n
.
Thus, in this case we have that
[q(1− q)]n/2 > 1
eβn(n−1) (1 + 1/n)(n/2)
>
1
eβn(n−1) · √e . (20)
Hence α > 2
n
(n+1)e1/2+βn(n−1)
and
tmix = O
(
neβn(n−1)
2n
)
.
Case n odd: If we consider only profiles y such that Diff(y) = ±1 in (17) we get
α > 2
(
n
n+1
2
)
q
n+1
2 (1− q)n−12 = 2
(
n
n+1
2
)
(q(1− q))n/2
√
q
1− q .
Now observe that √
q
1− q = e
−β(n−1) and
(
n
n+1
2
)
>
1
2
· 2
n
n+ 1
.
By using bounds (19) and (20) for [q(1 − q)]n/2 we get tmix = O
(
neβ(n
2−1)
)
for every β > 0
and tmix = O
(
neβ(n
2−1)
2n
)
for β > log n/n.
The lower bound. In order to give a lower bound on the mixing time, we first show that,
for the Curie-Weiss model, K(x,y) can be written as a function of Diff(x), Diff(y) and of the
Hamming distance between the two profiles.
Lemma A.3. Let x,y ∈ {−1,+1}n be two profiles with magnetization Diff(x) and Diff(y)
respectively and let hx,y be their Hamming distance, i.e. the number of players where they
differ. Then
K(x,y) = n−Diff(x) · Diff(y) − 2hx,y.
Proof. As stated above, Φ(x) = n−Diff
2(x)
2 . In order to evaluate K(x,y) =
∑n
i=1 Φ(x−i, yi) −
(n− 2)Φ(x) let us name n1, n2 and n3 as follows
n1 = #{i ∈ [n] : xi = yi};
n2 = #{i ∈ [n] : xi = +1, yi = −1};
n3 = #{i ∈ [n] : xi = −1, yi = +1}.
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In other words, n1 is the number of players playing the same strategy in profiles x and y, n2 is
the number of players playing +1 in x and −1 in y, and n3 the number of players playing −1
in x and +1 in y. It holds that
n∑
i=1
Φ(x−i, yi) = n1
n− Diff2(x)
2
+ n2
n− (Diff(x)− 2)2
2
+ n3
n− (Diff(x) + 2)2
2
=
1
2
(
(n1 + n2 + n3)(n −Diff2(x)) + 4(n2 − n3)Diff(x)− 4(n2 + n3)
)
.
(21)
Now observe that n1+n2+n3 = n, 2(n2−n3) = Diff(x)−Diff(y), and (n2+n3) = hx,y. Hence
from (21) we get
n∑
i=1
Φ(x−i, yi) =
1
2
(
n(n+ Diff2(x)) + 2(Diff(x)− Diff(y))Diff(x) − 4hx,y
)
=
n2
2
− n− 2
2
Diff2(x)− Diff(x)Diff(y) − 2hx,y.
(22)
Thus
K(x,y) = n−Diff(x) · Diff(y) − 2hx,y.
Since the Hamming distance between two profiles is at most n, from the above lemma we
get the following observation.
Observation A.4. Let x,y be two profiles with Diff(x) · Diff(y) 6 0, then K(x,y) > −n.
Now we can give a lower bound on the mixing time by using the bottleneck-ratio technique.
Theorem A.5 (Lower bound). The mixing time of the all-logit dynamics for the Curie-Weiss
model is
tmix = Ω
(
eβn(n−2)
4n
)
.
Proof. Let S− ⊆ {−1,+1}n be the set of profiles x such that Diff(x) < 0, i.e.
S− = {x ∈ {−1,+1}n : Diff(x) < 0}
and observe that π(S−) 6 1/2. From Observation A.4 we have that for every x ∈ S− and
y ∈ S+ = {−1,+1}n \ S− it holds that
π(x)P (x,y) =
e−βK(x,y)
Z
6
eβn
Z
. (23)
Moreover, if we name x− the profile where everyone is playing −1 we have that
π(S−) > π(x−) >
1
Z
e−2βΦ(x−) =
1
Z
eβn(n−1). (24)
Hence, by using bounds (23) and (24), and the fact that the size of S− is at most 2
n−1, we can
bound the bottleneck at S− with
B(S−) =
Q(S−, S+)
π(S−)
=
∑
x∈S−
∑
y∈S+
π(x)P (x,y)
π(S−)
6
22n−2eβn
eβn(n−1)
=
22n−2
eβn(n−2)
.
By using the bottleneck-ratio theorem (see e.g. Theorem 7.3 in [26]) it follows that
tmix = Ω
(
eβn(n−2)
22n
)
.
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Remarks. In this section we proved upper and lower bounds on the mixing time of the
all-logit dynamics for the Curie-Weiss model. In particular, the upper bound shows that for
β = O(1/n2) the mixing time is constant and for β = O(log n/n2) it is at most polynomial.
The lower bound shows that, for every constant ε > 0, if β > (1 + ε)(log 4)/n the mixing time
is exponential. When β is between Θ(log n/n2) and Θ(1/n) we still cannot say if mixing is
polynomial or exponential.
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